Iran and the Law

Just ask Nietzsche: the law is for pussies.

I’ve recently come to believe that it’s actually been about Iran all along. The goal in Iraq was to gain a military base from which to attack Iran. Then they would go after Iran; the center of the axis of evil.

Bush has consistently condemned Iran, starting from the earliest days of his administration. Rumsfeld has a hands on anti-Iran history (that was the basis for his aiding Saddam, and was at the center of Iran/Contra), as do the rest of the Neocons. I’m convinced that these guys are obsessed with a mission to pay back Iran for taking over our Embassy years ago.

What’s scary is that their time is running out. I’m afraid they believe that if they don’t act before the November elections, they may forever lose the opportunity to attack Iran. I can only hope I’m wrong…

What if we paint an airplane in UN colors and provoke Iran into shooting it down first, before we bomb them?

You know. Strategery.

MY--I have always read that most terrorist attacks are preceded by a lot of signals chatter, and that anti-terror people gauge the likelihood and severity of the attack in part by the volume of chatter.

So: how do you compare the volume of chatter about Iran now to the volume of chatter about attacking Iraq in DC in 2002? Is it pretty much the same situation? I had friends there who said in early 2002 that everyone in D.C. knew that the war was already a done deal, just waiting for the pretext. Is that the feeling in D.C. about Iran, too?

My guess is they will get some kind of open-ended Congressional resolution - more explicit than those already existing - before the bombardment begins.

U.S. military officers swear an oath to uphold the Constitution, not one to obey our civilian leadership like enlisted people do.

I doubt many of our officers would attack Iran with Congressional authorization.

(monkyboy - you meant "I doubt...withOUT Congressional authorization." didn't you?)

Jeez, I REALLY don't like where that road might take us - the leaders of the armed forces refusing orders from the Commander-In-Chief (such as he is)... some obeying and some not... some getting pissed off about some obeying and some not....

I'm wondering how many people supported President Clinton's bombing of the al Shifa plant in Sudan. While vastly more limited in scope than what's being floated in Iran, it seems the principle's the same.

Well, on the WPA, it is not just Dick Cheney that has argued it is unconstitutional. Every President has argued the same, including the Clinton and Carter Administrations. It just has never really come before the Supreme Court, as presidents have tried to comply with it so as to undertake military action as a relatively united country; this is one area where signing statements have been helpful. "We are complying with the WPA eventhough we don't have to because the President is the CIC, no matter what Curt Weldon may say."

Real constitutional scholars feel this way, not just John Yoo types. So Bush may violate the WPA, but he would have the backing of Clinton, Carter, and John Kerry who all have said it is unconstitutional.

Check the oil price futures They're flat through the next several years.

We are in Never-never-land again, if we're planning a surprise attack this way. There are probably office pools out there on exactly when the surprise attack will take place. It reminds me of America's secret war in Central America, which got a lot of publicity, but always under the name "Secret War". It's like covering up your eyes and thinking you're invisible.

We have the advantage of surprise, and the Iranians won't even know what hit them. And of course, as a stupid third world people, they've made no preparations at all.

I now doubt that the war will begin before the elections, even though I've been sure since March that it would. Glad to have been wrong, in this case. Hope that I was, anyway.

If the Democrats regain Congress, I doubt that the war will take place. But if they don't I'm sure that it will.

If they do, I hope they hit the ground running, investigate everything, and wave the bloody shirt. If the Democrats do a Clinton bypartisan comity thing, they'll be gutted and filleted in 2008.

Bush will just sign the Declaration of War: The Short Form.

Seemingly, there will always be enough Democrats to support Bush in any endeavor.

"Bipartisan." I was using the Iglesias Spelchek.

The only clue I have is that Bill Arkin of WaPo had several columns during the summer saying "Not yet" and after Labor Day has not mentioned Iran. That is what I would expect, if an surprise attack on Iran was imminent, the people with Pentagon sources would suddenly go silent.

Gregory,
Did you read what Matt put up:
(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces

Clinton launched the cruise missile attacks less than 2 weeks after the U.S. embassies were blown up in Tanzania and Kenya. It was a response to a direct attack. When was the last time Iran seriously attacked American interests?

Hmmm, this says:

To be sure, the WPR declares that it should not be "construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d)(2). But just as clearly, the WPR assumes that the President already has such authority, and indeed the WPR states that it is not "intended to alter the constitutional authority of the . . . President." Id. § 1547(d)(1). Furthermore, although the WPR announces that, in the absence of specific authorization from Congress, the President may introduce armed forces into hostilities only in "a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces," id. § 1541(c), even the defenders of the WPR concede that this declaration -- found in the "Purpose and Policy" section of the WPR -- either is incomplete or is not meant to be binding. See, e.g., Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the President Under the War Powers Resolution, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 79, 81 (1984).(3)

In our view, the [War Powers] Resolution lends support to the broader conclusion that the President has authority, without specific statutory authorization, to introduce troops into hostilities in a substantial range of circumstances. Although the Resolution asserts that "[t]he constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief" to introduce armed forces into actual or indicated hostilities are limited to three specific circumstances (i.e., when undertaken pursuant to a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, or in a national emergency created by an attack on the United States, its territories or its armed forces), id. § 1541(c), the Resolution also declares that nothing in it "is intended to alter the constitutional authority . . . of the President." Id. § 1547(d)(1). The Executive Branch has traditionally taken the position that the President's power to deploy armed forces into situations of actual or indicated hostilities is not restricted to the three categories specifically marked out by the Resolution. (8) Furthermore, as we have recently argued,

the structure of the War Powers Resolution (WPR) recognizes and presupposes the existence of unilateral Presidential authority to deploy armed forces `into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.' 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1). The WPR requires that, in the absence of a declaration of war, the President must report to Congress within 48 hours of introducing armed forces into such circumstances and must terminate the use of United States armed forces within 60 days (or 90 days, if military necessity requires additional time to effect a withdrawal) unless Congress permits otherwise. Id. § 1544(b). This structure makes sense only if the President may introduce troops into hostilities or potential hostilities without prior authorization by the Congress: the WPR regulates such action by the President and seeks to set limits to it.

OLC Haiti Letter at 3. (9)

[...]
WALTER DELLINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel

No offense, but I'll take Walter Dellinger's opinion over yours...

Al - this is a little silly, in that no lawyer can work for the OLC if they don't take this position. It's a job requirement.

I don't doubt that Clinton and Carter asserted the same. This is a classic example of something that used to matter in this country - institutional interests. Congressmen used to care about the authority of Congress. Presidents used to care about the powers of Presidents. While increasingly people of both parties care about partisan interests more than institutional interests, there is no question that the Republicans are the ones who have really completely devoted themselves to their party uber alles.

The legal argument against this is much stronger than most of the recent Republicans arguments - I think it's wrong, but it's not laughable. Not that it matters. The Supreme Court will find for Bush regardless of anything. Read Bush v. Gore again - the Supreme Court increasingly identifies with its partisan identification rather than its institutional one.

However, you should remember that I don't just think it's wrong because Bush is in the White House. It's wrong because the Constitution gave Congress the power to declare War. While the President is the Commander-in-Chief, I think the textual power to "declare war" makes it clear that Congress can limit how the President exercises that power. Also, we generally see the executive as executing the laws - which gives the President over "tactics" in a sense. The Legislature is necessary to pass and create laws, dictate policy - which gives the Congress the power over broad "strategy".

The Conservative argument on this reads the "declare war" power out of the Constitution. The Liberal - pro-Congressional - position allows both clauses to make sense.

Personally, I'm betting the attacks will occur in early November, the media will completely roll over, and the Republicans will win the mid-terms. Absolutely everything with these people involves their domestic power - and they (correctly) don't view any of our external enemies as threatening that domestic power.

I think the argument of whether it would be legal or not to do it is something of a sidetrack, since this Administration has a proven track record of doing things of dubious legality and looking to other folks to clean up the mess afterwards.

If there is one thing that can be said about this Administration, it is that it is completely certain of it's own judgement. If it decides that Iran needs attackin', then it's a pretty safe be that they'll go ahead and do it and worry about the concequences later. After all, these are the people that make up their own reality as a matter of course.

Barring an outright mutiny in the military, it's also a pretty safe bet that the Pentagon will carry out his orders even if they consider them wrongheaded.

MdtoMn,

Of course, I agree that the views of executive branch officials, even Democrats, may be likely to differ from the views of Congress as to the WPR. But one reason to doubt that Congress meant for Section 2(c) (the section Matthew cites) to be an operative restraint on the President's actions is that even the lawsuits initiated by members of Congress under the WPR do not cite that provision as such a restraint. Take a look at Camprbell v Clinton, for example (which was the suit by 30 (or so) members of Congress against President Clinton regarding Clinton's breaches of the WPR in the Kosovo conflict). That suit did not even attempt to argue that Section 2(c) was a restraint on Clinton's ability to initiate military actions in Kosovo. Instead, the suit was premised on (1) the lack of a declaration of war under the Constitution and (2) the WPR requirement that forces be withdrawn after 60 days if Congress hasn't approved. If Section 2(c) was intended to be an operative restraint on the President's ability to initiate military action, you would think that it would have been one of the causes of action. But it wasn't because even Congress doesn't agree with Matthew's assertion.

Did Clinton get Congressional authorization for either of his Balkan air campaigns?

From the Congressional Record, debate on HR 6198, the Iran Freedom Support Act, read by Kucinich.

The End of the ``Summer of Diplomacy'': Assessing U.S. Military Options on Iran

A CENTURY FOUNDATION REPORT
(By Sam Gardiner, Colonel, USAF (Ret.))

This report is part of a series commissioned by The Century Foundation to inform the policy debate about Iran-related issues.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Century Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

``The doctrine of preemption remains sound and must remain an integral part of our national security strategy. We do not rule out the use of force before the enemy strikes.''--Stephen Hadley, March 16, 2006.

Introduction

The summer of diplomacy began with a dramatic announcement: on May 31, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that if the Ahmadinejad government agreed to halt Iran's nuclear enrichment program, the United States would talk directly with Tehran. Secretary Rice crafted the statement working alone at home. She called President Bush and received his approval. The Bush administration announced it as a significant initiative; it appeared to reflect a major change in policy.

This shift was not uncontroversial within the administration; Vice President Dick Cheney had opposed the announcement. But the rationale that prevailed seems to have been that if the United States were going to confront Iran, the diplomacy box had to be checked. The secretary of state was given the summer to try it.

Well, the summer is over. Diplomacy was given a chance, and it now seems that the diplomatic activity of the past several months was just a pretext for the military option.

Unfortunately, the military option does not make sense. When I discuss the possibility of an American military strike on Iran with my European friends, they invariably point out that an armed confrontation does not make sense--that it would be unlikely to yield any of the results that American policymakers do want, and that it would be highly likely to yield results that they do not. I tell them they cannot understand U.S. policy if they insist on passing options through that filter. The ``making sense'' filter was not applied over the past four years for Iraq, and it is unlikely to be applied in evaluating whether to attack Iran.

In order to understand the position of those within the U.S. government who will make the final decision to execute a military option against Iran, you must first consider the seven key truths that they believe: Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction--that is most likely true. Iran is ignoring the international community--true. Iran supports Hezbollah and terrorism--true. Iran is increasingly inserting itself in Iraq and beginning to be involved in Afghanistan--true. The people of Iran want a regime change--most likely an exaggeration. Sanctions are not going to work--most likely true. You cannot negotiate with these people--not proven.

If you understand these seven points as truth, you can see why the administration is very close to being left with only the military option. Administration officials say that they want to give diplomacy a chance. But when they say that, we need to remind ourselves that they do not mean a negotiated settlement. They mean that Iran must do what we want as a result of our nonmilitary leverage: suspend enrichment, and we will talk. But enrichment appears to continue, and there are no direct discussions between the two main parties. Satisfied that nonmilitary leverage is not going to work, those who believe the seven ``truths'' argue that the only viable option remaining is a military one. The story, however, is more complicated.

This report draws on my long experience of running military war games to examine some of the complications of the current situation: the various pressures and rationales for an attack on Iran; the probable direct and indirect consequences of air strikes; the significant gap between what proponents of the military option want to achieve and what in fact such attacks will achieve; and the likelihood that policymakers will ignore those gaps and proceed to war despite them.

Timing and Uncertainty

Waiting makes it harder. The history of warfare is dominated by attackers who concluded that it was better to attack early than to wait. One source of the momentum in Washington for a strike on Iran's nuclear program is the strategic observation that if such an attack is in fact inevitable, then it is better done sooner than later.

I conducted a war game for the Atlantic Monthly magazine two years ago. On a chart prepared for a mock meeting of the National Security Council, I identified thirteen nuclear-related targets in Iran. I still do this kind of gaming. My most recent chart reflects twenty-four potential nuclear-related facilities. In the past few years we have seen Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility buried under more than fifteen meters of reinforced concrete and soil. There is evidence that similar hardening is taking place at other facilities, and there is some evidence of facilities being placed inside populated areas. The longer the United States waits, the harder the targets--and the harder the targeting.

Another major issue that affects timing is the conspicuous absence of reliable intelligence about Iran. A report by the House Intelligence Committee found that we have serious gaps in our knowledge of the Iranian nuclear program. Paradoxically, those gaps in intelligence produce not caution, but further pressure to attack. U.S. intelligence agencies do not know the locations of all of Iran's facilities; they are not certain how far Iran has gone with enrichment. They know that Iran's nuclear program bears a striking resemblance to the Pakistani program, but they do not know whether Iran has acquired technology that might put it ahead of current estimates.

Some U.S. officials say that Iran is ten years from a weapon. The Pentagon, we are told, is operating under the assumption that Iran could have a weapon in five years. Some Israeli estimates say that Iran could have a weapon in three years. John Negroponte, the U.S. director of national intelligence, recently said that Iran could not develop a nuclear weapon until some time in the next decade. But the next day, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he did not trust estimates of the Iranian program.

The very ambiguity of the intelligence picture has become another argument for military options, because even if U.S. policymakers could agree on a firm policy red line, there would be no way of determining if and when Iran crossed that line. Vice President Cheney's espoused calculation for dealing with global threats is that if there is even a 1 percent chance of a country passing WMD to a terrorist, the United States must act. Because there is a 1 percent chance Iran could pass WMD to a terrorist, the Bush administration finds itself obliged to reject nonmilitary options.

Regional Pressures

Adding to the political momentum toward war with Iran is significant pressure from the Israeli security establishment. Israel says that it has a plan for attacking Iranian nuclear facilities. Israel recently appointed an airman to be in charge of the Iranian theater of operations. It was announced that this major general would coordinate Israeli planning for Iran. Israeli military planners have U.S. penetrating weapons and a replica of the Natanz facility. They say that the attack would resemble the kind of operation they used against Egypt in 1967. They say that the plan involves more than just air strikes from the ``Hammers'' of the Israeli Air Force's 69 Squadron. It would include Shaldag commando teams, possibly some version of sea-launched missiles, and even explosive-carrying dogs that would penetrate the underground facilities.

Israel probably could hit most of the known nuclear targets. But such an attack would leave Iran with significant retaliatory options. That is a serious problem. U.S. forces and interests in the region would be likely targets of Iranian retaliation, so even an independent Israeli military operation would have critical consequences for the United States.

Part of the problem is that the two countries' red lines for Iran are not the same. Israel's red line is enrichment. The U.S. red line used to be the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon. But over the past six months, America's red line has drifted closer to Israel's. On March 21, the president said that the United States could not allow Iran to have the knowledge to make a weapon. He repeated the phrase in August.

By redrawing the red line in this manner, U.S. policymakers are creating pressure to go to war with Iran. In saying that Iran could not be permitted to have the knowledge to develop nuclear weapons, the president used almost the exact words the Israeli Foreign Minister had used a year earlier. More recently, a senior State Department official said that Iran was near ``the point of no return'' on its nuclear program. Again, this was an exact echo of the words of Israeli officials. The Israeli pressure has worked.

Marketing the Military Option

I often hear from those who were strongly supportive of the Iraq invasion that the targeting of the Iranian facilities would be simple. If you understand the elements of the nuclear process, all you have to do is go after a small number of targets. The argument continues that Iran's nuclear facilities could be devastated on a single night, in a single strike, by a small number of U.S. B-2 bombers. The apparent ease of the operation is another element of this pressure to go now: If the Iranian nuclear program can be stopped in one night by a simple strike, why should the United States wait?

But the elimination of Iran's nuclear capability, while it might be the stated aim for the United States, is only part of the objective. While the Iranian regime's weapons program is a genuine source of concern, American policymakers are also troubled by Iran's interference in Iraq. Despite U.S. warnings, the Revolutionary Guard continues to supply weapons, money, and training to insurgents inside Iraq. Some proponents of attacking Iran feel that Tehran should be punished for supporting militias and extremists in Iraq.

In addition to Iran's role as an aspiring nuclear rogue and a supporter of the insurgency in Iraq, the country has been repeatedly portrayed as a key adversary in the war on terrorism. The United States has put Iran into a separate and new terrorism category, dubbing it the ``Central Banker of Terrorism.'' The new National Security Strategy says, ``Any government that chooses to be an ally of terror, such as Syria or Iran, has chosen to be an enemy of freedom, justice, and peace. The world must hold those regimes to account.'' ``Unnamed intelligence officials,'' citing evidence from satellite coverage and electronic eavesdropping, have told the press that Iran is hosting al Qaeda, granting senior operatives freedom to communicate and plan terrorist operations.

Indeed, the case against the regime is so forceful, and so multifaceted, that it becomes clear that the goal is not simply to do away with the regime's enrichment program. The goal is to do away with the regime itself.

And on top of all of those pressures--pressure from Israel, pressure from those worried about a nuclear Iran, Iran in Iraq, and Iran in the war on terrorism--is another, decisive piece of the puzzle: President George W. Bush. The argument takes several forms: the president is said to see himself as being like Winston Churchill, and to believe that the world will only appreciate him after he leaves office; he talks about the Middle East in messianic terms; he is said to have told those close to him that he has got to attack Iran because even if a Republican succeeds him in the White House, he will not have the same freedom of action that Bush enjoys. Most recently, someone high in the administration told a reporter that the president believes that he is the only one who can ``do the right thing'' with respect to Iran. One thing is clear: a major source of the pressure for a military strike emanates from the very man who will ultimately make the decision over whether to authorize such a strike-the president. And these various accounts of his motivations and rationales have in common that the president will not allow does-not-make-sense arguments to stand in the way of a good idea.

Below the CNN Line

Stay below the ``CNN line.'' That was the guidance given to the Air Component Commander, General Mike Mosley, as the secret air strikes began against Iraq in operation SOUTHERN FOCUS. It was July 2002. This classified bombing campaign would involve strikes on almost 400 targets. It was initiated just after the president visited Europe where he announced numerous times, ``I have no war plans on my desk.''

There was no UN resolution. The congressional authorization was not to come for four months. But the United States was starting the war.

All of the pressures described above are pushing for war with Iran, and increasingly, a public case for such a war is being made. But behind the scenes, military operations are already under way. (See Figure 1.) Most likely, the same guidance has been given to military commanders. The pattern is repeating.

When U.S. commandos began entering Iran--probably in the summer of 2004--their mission appears to have been limited. The objective was to find and characterize the Iranian nuclear program. From press reports, we know that the task force doing these operations was implanting sensors to detect radioactivity. Intelligence for these early operations inside Iran was coming from information provided by A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani dealer in black market nuclear material. The incursions were focused in the northeast, where the Iranian nuclear facilities are concentrated. The base of these incursions was most likely Camp War Horse in Iraq.

Israel also was conducting operations inside Iran in late 2003 or early 2004. The Israeli commandos reportedly were operating from a base in Iraq. These commandos also were implanting sensors. I would expect the U.S. and Israeli operations to have been coordinated. At about this time the United States began operating remotely piloted vehicles inside Iran over nuclear facilities. (Although this was certainly an embarrassment to the Iranians, they mentioned the flights numerous times in their press.)

In 2005, the balance within the U.S. government shifted in favor of those who were pushing for regime change in Iran. This was to result in the eventual creation of the Iran/Syria Operations Group inside the State Department, a request to Congress for $75 million, and the creation of a robust ``democracy promotion'' program. Meanwhile the United States moved from intelligence collection inside Iran, to establishing contact with ethnic minorities, to being involved in--and most likely conducting---direct action missions. Reports suggest that the United States is supporting militant groups in the Baluchistan region of Iran. There have been killings and kidnappings in this region. Iran Revolutionary Guard convoys have been attacked. In a New Yorker article, Seymour Hersh confirmed that this region was one of the areas where U.S. forces were operating. The Iranian press also has accused the United States of operating there. In addition, press reports suggest that the United States may be sponsoring former members of the Iraq-based MEK (Mojahedin-e Khalq) in Baluchistan.

I recently attended a Middle East security conference in Berlin. At dinner one night, I sat next to the Iranian ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali-Asghar Soltanieh. I told him I had read that the Iranians were accusing the United States of supporting elements in Baluchistan. I asked him how they knew that. Without any hesitation, Soltanieh told me that they have captured militants who confessed that they were working with the Americans.

The United States is also directly involved in supporting groups inside the Kurdish area of Iran. According to both western and Iranian press reports, the Iranian Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) has been allowed to operate from Iraq into Iran and has killed Revolutionary Guard soldiers. The Iranians have also accused the United States of being involved in shooting down two of their aircraft, an old C-130 and a Fa1con jet, carrying Revolutionary Guard leaders.

NEXT STEPS: Above the CNN Line

How do we get from being below the CNN line to the next step? The path is fairly clear. The United Nations Security Council will fall short of imposing serious sanctions on Iran. The United States, then, will look for a coalition of the willing to implement smart sanctions, focused on the Iranian leadership.

But the sanctions will be designed less to ensure compliance from the Iranians than to generate domestic and international support for the American position. I do not know an Iranian specialist I trust who believes that the sanctions would cause the Iranians to abandon their nuclear program, any more than did the sanctions on India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests in 1998. The sanctions will be used to raise the collective conscience that Iran is a threat, and to convince the world that the United States has tried diplomatic solutions.

If the experience of 1979 and other sanctions scenarios is a guide, sanctions will actually empower the conservative leadership in Iran. There is an irony here. It is a pattern that seems to be playing out in the selection of the military option. From diplomacy to sanctions, the administration is not making good-faith efforts to avert a war so much as going through the motions, eliminating other possible strategies of engagement, until the only option left on the table is the military one.

When imposing the sanctions fails to alter Tehran's position, policymakers will revert to a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. One can imagine the words of a planner in the meeting: ``If we are going to do this, let's make certain we get everything they have.'' I have done some rough ``targeting'' of nuclear facilities for which I can find satellite photos on the Web. By my calculation, an attack of relatively high certainty on nuclear targets would require 400 aim points. (An aim point is the specific location where an individual weapon is directed. Most targets would have multiple aim points.) I estimate seventy-five of these aim points would require penetrating weapons. (See Table 1, page 12.)

But it is unlikely that a U.S. military planner would want to stop there. Iran probably has two chemical weapons production plants. He would want to hit those. He would want to hit Iran's medium-range ballistic missiles that have just recently been moved closer to Iraq. There are fourteen airfields with sheltered aircraft. Although the Iranian Air Force is not much of a threat, some of these airfields are less than fifteen minutes flying time from Baghdad. Military planners would want to eliminate that potential threat. The Pentagon would want to hit the assets that could be used to threaten Gulf shipping. That would mean targeting cruise missile sites, Iranian diesel submarines, and Iranian naval assets.

TABLE 1. TARGETS IN IRAN
Initial strikes Follow-on strikes
Nuclear facilities Revolutionary Guard bases.
Military air bases Command and governance assets:
Air defense command and control Intelligence
Terrorist training camps Military command
Chemical facilities Radio and television
Medium-range ballistic missiles Communications
23rd Commando Division Security forces in Tehran.
Gulf-threatening assets:
Submarines Leadership: targeted killing.
Anti-ship missiles
Naval ships
Small boats

After going through the analysis, I believe that the United States can and will conduct the operation by itself. There may be low-visibility support from Israel and the U.K., and France may be consulted. But it will be an American operation.

What about casualties? Although the United States would suffer casualties in the Iranian retaliation, the honest answer to the president if he asks about losses during the strike itself is that there probably will not be any. The only aircraft penetrating deep

into Iranian airspace will be the B-2s at night. B-52s will stand off, firing cruise missiles. Other missile attacks will come from Navy ships firing at a safe distance.

Targeting the Nuclear Program? Or the Regime?

Air-target planners orchestrate strikes on the basis of desired target destruction criteria. In the case of an attack on Iran, after five nights of bombing, we can be relatively certain of target destruction. It is even possible to project the degree to which parts of the Iranian nuclear program would be set back. For example, using Web pictures of the Natanz enrichment facility, it is possible to see three years worth of construction. An attack on that construction might appear to set the program back three years. But it is hard to judge. David Kay, the former top U.S. weapons inspector, observed during our discussions that there is the program we see, but there is also the program we do not see. Because of the gaps in U.S. intelligence on Iran, and specifically on Iran's nuclear program, American military leaders are growing increasingly uneasy about the reliability and comprehensiveness of target selection. In other words, after the five-night military attack we would not be able with any degree of certainty to say how we had impacted the Iranian nuclear program.

If this uncertainty does not appear to worry the proponents of air strikes in Iran it is in no small part because the real U.S. policy objective is not merely to eliminate the nuclear program, but to overthrow the regime. It is hard to believe, after the misguided talk prior to Iraq of how American troops would be greeted with flowers and welcomed as liberators, but those inside and close to the administration who are arguing for an air strike against Iran actually sound as if they believe the regime in Tehran can be eliminated by air attacks.

In this case, the concept is not a ground force Thunder Run into Tehran of the sort used in Baghdad. It is a decapitation-based concept. Kill the leadership and enable the people of Iran to take over their government. More reasonable leadership will emerge.

Under this concept, the air operation would take longer than the five nights. The targets would be expanded. The Revolutionary Guard units would be attacked since according to the argument they are the primary force that keeps the current regime in power. There are other regime protection units in Tehran. Most important, the U.S. operation would move into targeted killing, seeking to eliminate the leadership of Iran.

It sounds simple. Air planners always tell a good story. By the same token, they almost always fall short of their promises, even in strictly military terms. That was true in World War II. It was true in Korea. It was true in Vietnam. It has just proved true with the Israeli attacks on Hezbollah. No serious expert on Iran believes the argument about enabling a regime change. On the contrary, whereas the presumed goal is to weaken or disable the leadership and then replace it with others who would improve relations between Iran and the United States, it is far more likely that such strikes would strengthen the clerical leadership and turn the United States into Iran's permanent enemy.

Iran's Response

Having demonstrated that air strikes are unlikely either to eliminate the nuclear program or to bring about the overthrow of the Islamic regime in Iran, we must now turn to what, precisely, they would achieve. It is important to remember that some of Iran's threats, demonstrations of new weapons, and military exercises are designed to have a deterrent effect. As such we should not deduce too much about what Iran would do in the event of an attack on the basis of what it might say and do in advance of an attack. A former CIA Middle East Station Chief told me once that predicting the consequences of a strategic event in the Middle East was as difficult as predicting how an Alexander Calder mobile would come to rest after you flicked one of its hanging pieces.

It is possible, however, to identify some high probability immediate consequences.

The Iranians would likely look to target Israel as a response to a U.S. strike, using Hezbollah as the primary vehicle for retaliation. For Tehran, there is the added benefit that blaming Israel (even for a U.S. strike) would play well at home, and probably throughout the region.

Moqtada al-Sadr has said publicly that if the United States were to attack Iran, he would target U.S. forces in Iraq.

Iran could channel more individuals and weapons into Iraq. Specifically, Iran could upgrade technology among Shiite militias, with weapons like the laser-guided anti-tank missiles Hezbollah had in Lebanon. We might even see more direct operations like missile attacks against U.S. forces.

Moqtada al-Sadr controls the large Facilities Protection Service forces in Iraq. Some estimates put this force as large as 140,000. Among other missions, they guard the oil pipelines. If Iran wants to cut the flow of oil, Iraq is the best place to begin, and the means are in place to take on the mission. The impact of severing Iraq's oil supplies would be an immediate increase in its own oil revenue.

Iran is not going to wipe Israel from the map or force the United States to leave Iraq with these operations. But in causing these various complications, Iran can still achieve a degree of success. As we recently witnessed in the clash between Hezbollah and Israel, Iran can seem stronger just by virtue of making the United States and Israel seem weaker.

Round Two

Once the nature of the Iranian retaliation becomes apparent, the United States will not likely declare success and walk away from the problem. Clearly, the pressure will be to expand the targets and punish Iran even more. The government of Iran is fragile, the thinking goes; it could even be on the verge of falling; it is time to ``enable'' the Iranian people. The Iranians will react with their own horizontal escalation. (See Table 2, page 16.)

Iran has been sending mixed signals about whether or not it would cut its own oil production or attempt to restrict the flow of oil from the Gulf. A strike of five nights might not push them to cut the flow of oil. But continued operations probably would. Iran does have some flexibility to do without oil revenues for a period because of surpluses from currently high oil prices. In addition, it has plans for rationing refined petroleum products that it must import.

Executing the oil option might not be limited to operations against tankers moving in and out of the Gulf. Iran has the capability, and we have seen some indications of the intent, to attack facilities of other oil providers in the region.

It would be tougher for Iran and Hezbollah to attack UN forces in Lebanon. If the UN forces were to become too aggressive in response to Hezbollah attacks against Israel, they would most likely become targets. In addition, at some point in the expanding conflict, Iran might see a value to making the war about attempts at Western domination of the region and not just about the United States and Israel. In that case, a focused attack on something like the Italian headquarters would resonate in the region.

It took a while for the nations of the region to react to the Israeli attack into Lebanon. That most likely would be the case in the event of a U.S. strike against Iran. As attacks continued and as the television coverage intensified, however, we could see something similar to the reactions to the Danish cartoons. We could see the ``Arab Street'' asserting itself.

Syria and Iran signed a defense agreement on June 15. Under this agreement Syrian forces would be brought into a fight if Iran were attacked. Syrian President Bashar Assad might be a reluctant participant, but as the conflict expands, he might not have a choice.

The Iranians could conduct targeted killing outside the region. They have used this tactic in the past: in 1991, Shapour Bakhtiar, the Shah's last prime minister, was decapitated in his apartment in Paris.

Continued air strikes and demonstrations could have a compounding effect. Weak governments in the Muslim world could be threatened. The governments of Pakistan, Jordan, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia are vulnerable.

TABLE 2. CONSEQUENCES OF AN ATTACK

Type of Operation
Short strike Regime change
Hezbollah attacks on Israel High probability High probability.
Attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq High probability High probability.
Sabotage pipelines in Iraq High probability High probability.
Street demonstrations on a wide scale Possible High probability.
Hezbollah attacks outside the region Possible High probability.
Iran stopping its own oil exports Possible High probability.
Iran blocking Gulf oil flow High probability High probability.
Iran attacking other regional oil facilities Possible Possible.
Iran suicide attacks Not likely Possible.
Syria involved Not likely Possible.
Threats to regional governments Not likely Possible.

As an obvious consequence of the instability resulting from a U.S. strike, the price of oil almost certainly will spike. The impact will depend on how high and how long. The longer the conflict goes, the higher the price. A former Kuwaiti oil minister privately suggested a plateau of $125 per barrel. Confidential analysis by a major European bank suggests it would level off at $130, and a very conservative estimate would be over $200.

With prices surging to this level, third order consequences become apparent. The most obvious would be a global, synchronized recession, intensified by the existing U.S. trade and fiscal imbalances. Another political consequence would be that oil exporting countries outside the region would enjoy significant surges in revenue from higher prices. As a result, countries such as Venezuela and Russia would enjoy expanded influence while the West would be reeling from recession.

I should note that in the preceding discussion of the cycle of action and reaction, I have not mentioned large U.S. ground unit formations. That is because I do not believe we will come to a point where that option will make sense to policymakers. This is the one lesson the administration seems to have learned from Iraq--occupation does not work. And that realization brings us back to why the air strike option has been so attractive to the administration from the beginning.

When Is the Strike?

When does it all come together? When could the United States pull the trigger on the military option? The most important point in understanding the window for an attack is that the military preparations will not be the determining factor. This operation will not resemble the six months of preparations for Operation Desert Shield in 1990. The preparations will be much less visible than the movements to the region in early 2003. We will not read about discussions with Turkey for basing permission. It will not be a major CNN event.

Instead, preparations will involve the quiet deployment of Air Force tankers to staging bases. We will see additional Navy assets moved to the region. The more significant indications will come from strategic influence efforts to establish domestic political support. The round of presidential speeches on terrorism is a beginning, but I expect more. An emerging theme for the final marketing push seems to be that Iran threatens Israel's existence. We can expect the number of administration references to Iran to significantly increase, and will see three themes--the nuclear program, terrorism, and the threat to Israel's existence.

The issue of congressional approval plays into the timing question. Administration officials have been asked numerous times if the president would require authorization by Congress for a strike on Iran. Secretary Rice responded to that question before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 2005 by saying, ``I will not say anything that constrains his authority as Command in Chief.'' Congressmen Peter DeFazio and Maurice Hinchey offered an amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill in June that would have required the president to get authorization from Congress before taking military action against Iran. The amendment failed.

Over the past few months, we have seen numerous leaks and administration documents that raise an Iran-al Qaeda connection. In addition, the House Permanent Select Committee report on the threat of Iran implied an al Qaeda connection. This linkage of Iran and al Qaeda fits neatly into the broader effort to sell a strike to the American people. But more importantly, it opens the way for an argument that a strike on Iran was part of the global war on terrorism already authorized by Congress.

In other words, approval by Congress does not necessarily have to be part of the calculation of when an attack could take place. If the determining factor of timing is neither the preparation of military forces nor congressional approval, one question remains: How much public support do decisionmakers believe they need before pulling the trigger? And that question brings us back to the beginning of the summer of diplomacy. Vice President Cheney had to be convinced that it was necessary to give some lip service to diplomacy, checking that box in order to secure public support. President Bush seems to be convinced of the rightness of his cause and vision. He repeats often that he does not care about public opinion.

The window for a strike on Iran stands open.

Finally

Policymakers who begin with the seven ``truths'' of the situation can easily proceed down a path that leaves the military option as the only one on the table. There is a certain inevitability to this path, a certain inexorability to the momentum toward war. The policymakers will say that the Iranians have forced us to go in this direction. But the painful irony is that these policymakers are forcing the direction on themselves.

At the end of the path that the administration seems to have chosen, will the issues with Iran be resolved? No. Will the region be better off? No. Is it clear Iran will abandon its nuclear program? No. On the other hand, can Iran defeat the United States militarily? No.

Will the United States force a regime change in Iran? In all probability it will not. Will the economy of the United States suffer? In all probability it will.

Will the United States have weakened its position in the Middle East? Yes. Will the United States have reduced its influence in the world? Yes.

When I finished the 2004 Iran war game exercise, I summarized what I had learned in the process. After all the effort, I am left with two simple sentences for policymakers. ``You have no military solution for the issues of Iran. You have to make diplomacy work.'' I have not changed my mind. That conclusion made sense then. It still makes sense today.

Robert Earle is on the mark: We're in a helluva fix when we need to rely on the legal interpretations of our Praetorians. I don't mean to disparage military leadership by that, not at all. But it's not the thing that we're supposed to rely on in a situation like this, and if we do have to rely on it, it's an awful precedent.

Thank you, MY, for posting this, and similar remarks. To my mind, avoiding a truly epochal catastrophe in Iran is absolutely central.

Given the sheer number of people who would be involved, and given our modern civilian informational infrastructure allowing rumors to go from uttered to talking point within days, I don't see how a surprise attack is possible. You can't set up a bombing campaign without involving tens of thousands of people, mostly young enlisted personel with no compunction against gab.

"A few people at dinner," eh? See you in Broderland, Matt!

The sanctions against Iran, created by Clinton's executive orders in 1995, aren't working. Therefore, a blockade is needed. Not to worry. No missiles. But a blockade is, legally, an act of war. So the next escalation step might by a warning shot from Iran, or some other Iranian action that seems disrespectful. And after that warning shot, who are most Americans gonna side with? The monsters who are shooting at us and disrespecting us? Hell, no! Remember the Maine! Remember the Gulf of Tonkin! The missiles will fly. Blood will flow ... but oil might not flow very well for a while.

RELAX - no attack until after the election. No threats or sanctions until after the elections. We've got to keep the oil prices down.

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