Sistani Says No

To the administration's plan for a SCIRI/Hashemi/Kurd coalition aimed at taking down Muqtada al-Sadr. The grand ayatollah says he supports Shiite unity, and will not endorse any coalition aimed at dividing the Shiites. This seems like a smart move to me. Sistani's early political interventions were highly effective, but quickly began compromising his position as a religious leader. To choose sides in an intra-communal dispute, especially to choose in a manner that put him on the side of the foreign occupiers, would merely further risk his standing.

12/23/06 12:23PM del.icio.us this incoming links

Comments

Since for the last couple of years the guns are doing the talking (and deciding) for Shias isn't Sistani really irrelevant now?

OTOH, when the time comes to bury the hatchet between intra-Shia and intra-Iraqi factions, he might prove instrumental.

Moreover, on the issue at hand, I tend to think that getting rid of Sadr - if it's possible- doesn't strike me as a particularly bad idea. I am interested though in the feasibility of the endeavor and the unintended consequences. Weakening Sadr means SCIRI gains in strength if not becoming dominant. To what extent is this a good development? SCIRI is considered pro-Iranian if I remember correctly.

Also, judging by the reports SCIRI's other big rival Dawa seems to be fading. Or am I wrong?

Posted by: Nick Kaufman on December 23, 2006 12:36 PM

One of Juan Cole's sources told him in August that provincial elections had been postponed by the US for fear that Sadr would sweep them.

As far as I can tell, the elections have never been held.

Democracy means the most popular leaders are the most powerful. In the Middle East, that means anti-American/anti-Israeli leaders are the most powerful.

You are guaranteed to lose if you try to fight this reality, and the sooner it gets smacked into your head the better.

You want to fight Sadr? Let's say you win and make him a martyr - now one of his lieutenants or nephews carries on the fight overseeing a fractured movement that represents at least a quarter of Iraq's population and agrees on only one thing, hatred of America.

Let's say, more likely, you never kill Sadr, just burnish his anti-colonial credentials, making his rivals look like American stooges in the process when they already are seen as under the control of Iran. Sooner or later there will be new elections. How do you expect Sadr to do?

The US performance in Iraq is like a real-life three stooges skit. Somebody is creatively coming up with the dumbest possible moves to make at any given time.

Posted by: Arnold Evans on December 23, 2006 02:14 PM

August 4, 2006

http://www.juancole.com/2006/08/38-dead-including-2-sadrists-killed-by.html

Patey was also concerned lest the Mahdi Army turn into an armed state within a state on the model of Hizbullah in Lebanon. I was told by an American official who had been in Baghdad that Iraqi provincial elections had been postponed because there are indications that Muqtada al-Sadr's movement is growing in popularity in the Shiite south and his lists might sweep to power. So Patey's fear is misplaced. The real prospect is that the Sadrists will be the government of Iraq, not just an armed outsider.

Posted by: Arnold Evans on December 23, 2006 02:17 PM

Ahh, the mild, familiar pleasures of prescience...

Posted by: Swopa on December 23, 2006 04:10 PM

Hey mr. Yglesias,

I disagree with your evaluation of Sistani's decision.

http://eteraz.org/story/2006/12/23/13919/861

[Although we both have to recognize that you probably cannot make this critique against Sistani]

I completely disagree [with Yglesias]. Sistani's move is merely further confirmation of his defeatism, which first manifested itself in September when he simply packed up his bags:

“I will not be a political leader any more,” he told aides. “I am only happy to receive questions about religious matters.”

Sistani is the one Shi'a who evokes respect across multiple spectrum. Yet he is completely unwilling to prevent Iraq from sliding towards a tripartite morass. Not only that, but by focusing on "Shi'a Unity" and ignoring "Muslim unity" he simply propagates and promotes the ends that al-Qaeda wanted to achieve: create a 30 years war between Sunni Islam and Shi'a Islam (in which they have succeeded as you now have Saudi Journalists calling Iran more dangerous than Israel, h/t Jihadwatch).

As a Muslim I am able to expect from my Muslim leaders to set sectarian "unities" aside for the sake of things like "peace between Muslims" and "less war between Muslim sects." As a Muslim I able to expect Sistani, even if he is Shi'a to advance the essential wisdom of Islam -- that tribalism takes second place to brotherhood. Sistani has failed Muslims twice on that account; and whether it is because he is too old; or too ascetic, doesn't matter to me. It is the fact that he shirked his responsibility as an Ayatollah and an Islamic Leader.

All he would have had to do was to make a bold push and to say to the Americans: I will create a unity government -- a sort of "Islamic Truce" on the condition you leave. He could have done it in September; and he could have done it now. People would have looked to him as the "liberator" of Iraq and he could have used his wisdom to end the internecine Muslim strife.

He didn't do any of that; as such, he means nothing to me.

Posted by: Ali Eteraz on December 23, 2006 04:12 PM

Ali,

You might be a Muslim, but you're not an Iraqi. I think you are being awfully presumptious assuming Sistani's goals should be the US's or that the US's reconciliation plan had any credibility anyway. The Sunni participation was a figleaf - basically one guy - and the Shi'ite participation was a power play by the most sectarian pro-Iranian leader - SCIRI - who supports hardcore federalism and iranian influence, both of which are anathema to the Sunni community.

Sistani clearly saw through the latest gambit as being a means of fulfilling American goals for the country and probably facilitating a long term presence of American troops. But Sistani OPPOSES THE OCCUPATION AND WANTS AMERICANS TO LEAVE - he just has a more moderate, long-term view of how to achieve these goals than Sadr does - but there goals/world views aren't very different in the grand scheme of things. After all, Sistani refuses to meet with Americans as he sees there presence in Iraq as illegitimate, just as Sadr does.

Posted by: Ben P on December 23, 2006 04:29 PM

From Sistani's perspective, two important things have been accomplished. One, Hakim's gambit - which Sistani and many other Iraqis, Sunni and Shi'ite saw as a personal power grab, giving advantage to both Iran and the US's political goals, while compromising Iraqi sovreignty - has been crushed. Secondly, Sadr has been reined in, at least for the time being - and has agreed to do things that less compromise the integrity of the Shi'ite community.

You have to understand that 1) Sistani's goals are not very different than Sadr's; 2) that the most "pro-American" Shi'ites also tend to be the most pro-Iranian; that 3) Sistani and Sadr have much more authority than the other Shi'ite leaders; 4) and both Sistani and Sadr are Iraqi nationalists, albeit of a Shi'ite natue - this is much less clear of Hakim.

One of the major conflicts in Iraq is between Sadr and Hakim. Especially, Basra, where the kind of stuff that is happening in Baghdad is happening, but on an inter-Shi'ite basis rather than on a Sunni-Shi'ite basis.

Posted by: Ben P on December 23, 2006 04:38 PM

Finally: on the Basra thing.

The reason you don't hear about this is because the US/English language reporting in the country is greatly compromised by three vital factors:
1) it is too dangerous to travel in much of the country as a foreinger
2) American journalists depended heavily on US embassy sources, and Green Zone politicans
3) The reporting, such as it occurs outside of the Green Zone, is very Baghdad-centric - because that is where the reporters are (and because it is very hard to travel outside of Baghdad without being embedded in a US military mission).

This is also one of the reasons I think that Lancet figure was dismissed by a lot of people in this country - because the reporting doesn't cover a lot of the stuff that is going on in cities like Basra, where a lot of people are being killed too. (this said, I think the Lancet figure is probably too high, but it is not as radically off the mark as some have assumed)

Posted by: Ben P on December 23, 2006 04:42 PM

I said "finally" but I didn't really mean it - I'm going to excerpt something from someone who knows a lot more about Iraqi politics than I, because the level of understanding of what is actually going on in Iraq in this country is very low.

The supposedly "new" political coalition is really an old coalition of exile parties. More to the point, these are blatantly sectarian parties who thrive on feeding ethnic divisions in the country and from manipulating US politicians into believing the false "3 Iraqs - Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish" framework and then grabbing for power and resources as the US tries to distribute them. They're at it again as the Bush Administration desperately flails around looking for a political way out of the ma2zaq they're in. Their goal is to press for the further decentralization of power (i.e., weakening of the central government in Baghdad) so that they can each try to grab power and resources in the regions of Iraq where their political power is relatively stronger. Obviously the Kurds have solid control of their region, but they are always seeking further loosening of ties from Baghdad. SCIRI as always is seeking means to grab power in the south, in particular away from the Sadrists. And while I haven't followed Hashimi and the Iraqi Islamic Party as closely, I can only presume given their history pre-war and their overt sectarian bent today they are hoping to pick up the "Sunni" spoils of this divisive policy (anyone with deeper knowledge of Hashimi and the IIP, please comment). Sadr is once again being presented by Washington as the extremist who is causing the real problems and that "solving" the Sadr problem will help things move forward. From Washington's perspective it seems obvious: his Jaysh al-Mahdi death squads are a big part of the sectarian killings going on, and politically he makes an easy scapegoat as the guy whose parliamentary supporters supposedly are blocking PM Maliki from Da'wa from doing the job he supposedly wants to but can't because of political dependence on Sadr. The raids on Sadr City a few months ago which Maliki demanded be called off (eventually successfully, though it took a little while) were emblematic -- Washington couldn't go after the sectarian killers because they had the political power to get the raids called off. So now the thinking from Washington is: form an alternative political coalition where Sadr doesn't have a say, then send the US army into Sadr City (boosted by the temporary surge of 15,000 to 30,000 troops) to clean out the Mahdi Army death squads and cut Sadr down to size militarily and hence politically. As usual, a bad misreading of what's really going on, resulting in a terrible idea that is going to cause a lot more damage than any short-term gains (if they even get those). For starters, even if the US, SCIRI, IIP, and KDP/PUK can put together a working coalition, what will really have been formed? The Bush Administration is touting it as a "moderate" (watch out, if Washington calls anyone around the world "moderate" these days, odds are they are ugly thugs who simply accept a US paycheck instead of somebody else's) multi-ethnic group which will supposedly allow the various ethnicities to then sit down at the table and find a way to share power. Not true. What you will get is a coalition of the same forces who rode the US into power almost 4 years ago and who are seeking a division of spoils to their benefit first and foremost, not a central state able to secure and govern the country. So even if Sadr is weakened momentarily, the powerful undercurrents feeding the sectarian and political violence will be strengthened. Militarily, the two Sadrist uprisings in 2004 show clearly the limits of attempts to crush Sadr -- they can be bloodied, but as a mass populist movement in a country the US does not have the ability to control militarily or even provide rudimentary personal security in, they cannot be destroyed. Any attempt to do so will only produce increased bitterness and anger. More Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters will go deeper underground and engage in more attacks similar in style to the Sunni insurgents. Politically, Sadr will receive a huge boost as well as the guy standing up to two very unpopular forces among most Iraqis: (1) US troops, and (2) decentralization forces. The unpopularity of US occupation forces - especially when they engage in major operations where they kill even more innocent civilians - I don't think needs any further explanation. But by the forces of decentralization, I refer in particular to SCIRI's regionalization push which I believe is highly unpopular except among Kurds and a small minority of SCIRI patrons who would personally benefit. I believe the vast majority of Arab Iraqis - Sadr's core supporters very much among them, but a huge cross section cutting across sectarian lines - believe the decentralization SCIRI is pushing is essentially the destruction of Iraq. Another immediate bit of blowback: the southern feeder lines to the Basrah Oil Terminal which carry roughly 80% of Iraq's oil exports remain highly vulnerable to attack. Despite the relatively short distance that the main trunklines are exposed (particularly on the Fao Peninsula), they were easily struck multiple times back in 2004. The fact that they have not been struck again since is not a reflection of significantly improved security, merely of the fact that the political forces in the region are aligned such that it is not in the interest of the key power brokers to see the lines shut. You cut Sadr's (huge) powerbase out of the official power structure and make it clear that the billions of revenue are going to flow instead to SCIRI who is trying to take over power at the local level where Sadr is strong and more broadly is trying to devolve power in a way many consider the destruction of Iraq -- well, there will suddenly be a huge group of powerful people who have an interest in stopping the flow of oil revenue to SCIRI. Sadrists in Basrah have made threats (how "official" they were is unclear to me) in the past to shut down the oil, I believe if there is a full scale political and military assault on them, they will renew and make good on those threats. For the global oil market this would have two important effects: (1) if the outages last for a significant period of time (worries start after a week, by 2-3 weeks its getting serious, a month or longer and its a major problem) then expect the flat price of crude to start spiking again and new highs to return to the gasoline pump before long, and (2) more importantly for the longer term, an actual major supply outage like this will drive up the front end of the futures price curve, possibly back into backwardation after the past few years of contango. This in turn will disincentive the holding of inventories by commercial oil companies and drive down oil stocks. That could help return the market to the sort of tightness that helped fuel the 2002-2006 price runup. Now, I don't want to be too alarmist, it would take a significant, long outage for Iraq to be able to structurally shift the market after the structural weakness in the curve and levelling off of the flat price in the last year. My point is just that if the US goes for broke on this trying to seriously crush Sadr, this now becomes a very real possibility. Finally, and it seems a bit of a minor point now, this I think explains the Sadrists rejoining the government. They're not eager for a knock down fight like this and would prefer to simply try to maintain their position. So rejoining the government and trying to keep the current political coalition in place will be their priority for the moment. The Bush Administration is pretty desperate though and SCIRI is always looking for a way to get the upper hand in the civil war. The political pressure is a full court press, and if we see the troop levels actually surge (as I expect) in the next couple months, I think this is going to happen.

Posted by: Ben P on December 23, 2006 04:56 PM

Ali Eteraz:

Are you a performance artist of some sort? Your foolishness and pretentiousness are so over-the-top that I assume it must be an act.

Posted by: Swopa on December 23, 2006 07:10 PM

Arnold Evans: here's DoD confirmation that those provincial elections haven't yet happened:

“Civil-military integration” is the key to solving Iraq’s problems, [Army Lt. Gen. Peter W.] Chiarelli [outgoing commander of Multinational Corps Iraq] said. Political and economic progress are as important as military might.

He outlined two key areas he believes will make a difference in the level of violence in Iraq: establishing provincial elections and creating employment opportunities for Iraq’s multitudes of “angry young men.”

Provincial elections are “absolutely critical” in getting people to feel they are properly represented in their government at all levels, Chiarelli said.
--AFIS Press Release dated December 8, 2006.

Posted by: RT on December 23, 2006 08:26 PM

mirc
mirç
mırc
mırç
mircturk
turkmirc
mirc indir
mirc yukle
mirch
mırch
mirc turk
turk mirc
mırcturk
turkmırc
mırc turk
turk mırc
turkiyemirc
türkiyemirc
turkiye mirc
türkiye mirc
mircturkiye
mirctürkiye
mirc turkiye
mircturk
turkmırc
muhabbet
forum
forum
turkforum
turkiyeforum
mirc
turkmirc
toplist
site ekle
pagerank
turkmirc
turkforum
sohbet
chat
sohbet odaları
bedava sohbet
bedava chat
türk
karar

Posted by: mirc on December 27, 2007 02:22 PM

thanx

Posted by: sikis on May 4, 2008 04:07 AM

sadasdaksdkşdasda

Posted by: erotikshop on August 8, 2008 04:22 AM

sex shop

Posted by: sex shop on August 8, 2008 04:23 AM

sadasdşaskdjddudasdas

Posted by: seksshop on August 8, 2008 04:24 AM

sadasdasasdasdasd

Posted by: zayıflama on August 8, 2008 06:33 AM

sadsadkasdkjaskdlasd

Posted by: zayıflama on August 8, 2008 07:06 AM

hjhjsahjkhuyyasjhbjnömbjk

Posted by: penis büyütmek on August 8, 2008 07:09 AM

sadsadjkdjkdjdıudasdjhdjasd

Posted by: penis büyütücü hap on August 8, 2008 07:15 AM

thanks fine

Posted by: erotik shop on September 10, 2008 11:23 AM

seks shop

Posted by: erotik shop on September 12, 2008 07:17 AM

cinselmerkez.com
aseks.net
erotikcamasirlar.com
vajinatr.com
bakirevajina.com
cinselkozmetik.com
kozmetikmedikel.com
eturknet.com
tecavuz.net
yutuvideo.com
ponotubesex.com
laraperuk.com
sackanagimerkezi.com
peruksa.com
perukmarket.com
aseks.com
aloveshop.com
erotikgiyim.com
geciktiricispreyler.com
geciktiricihap.com
geciktiriciler.com
azdirici.com
bayanuyarici.com
fntazialemi.com
fantaziservisi.om
cinselmazemeler.com
cinselfantaziurunleri.com
erotikdakikalar.com
erotikmarketiniz.com
seksmarketiniz.com
sekshatlari.com
erotikdergiler.com
erotikderginiz.com
penisbuyutucuviprx.com
penisbuyutucuvigrx.com
penisbuyutuculer.com
vigrxpenisbuyutucu.com
sismebebekler.com
sismebebekshop.com
yemekeviniz.com
sanalmarketiniz.com
elektronikmarket.net
ebedava.net
kontortr.com
elaydin23.com
turkcellkontorcu.com
aveakontoral.com
vodafonekontoral.com
toptankontorcu.com
ameribress.com
clitoriacream.net
superspenisbuyutucu.com
megabress.com
rednightperformans.com
performansartirici.com
penisplus.tv
penispluspenisbuyutucu.com
penispluspenisbuyutucu.net
harbiarkadas.com
harbiarkadas.net
harbiarkadas.org
itirafet.org
ebedava.net
elektronikmarket.net